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I. INTRODUCTION
"The question whether contractors may be sued, in any court, for
war casualties while the military services may not . . . could
determine whether the President, as Commander-in-Chief will be
able to deploy the Total Force decades into the future. "I
While the use of civilian contractors to support military
operations is not a new phenomenon in American history, their use
in the War on Terror 2 has been unprecedented. Whether one looks at
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Maryland; J.D., University of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., The Judge
Advocate General's Legal Center and School; LL.M. and S.J.D., University of
Virginia School of Law. This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Center
for Terrorism Law located at St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio,
Texas. The author wishes to acknowledge with special thanks the superb efforts of
research assistants Matthew D. Hill and Courtney Scipio, who supported this
Article with outstanding research and editing.
1. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST
POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 300 (2007) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 7, In re
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2033)).
2. The term "War on Terror" is used both as a metaphor to describe a
general conflict against all international terrorist groups and, more precisely, to
describe the ongoing international armed conflict between the United States of
America and the "Taliban, al-Qaeda, or associated forces." Military Commissions
Act of 2006 (MCA), 10 U.S.C. § 948a(l)(i) (2006). One of the clearest indications
of the Congressional authorization for war and for the use of the law of war, the
MCA lists "unlawful enemy combatants" as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
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the actual numbers of civilian contractors in active combat zones
overseas, which exceeds well over 100,000 in Iraq alone, 3 or in the
specific activities performed by civilian contractors, for example, the
use of civilian contractors as armed security forces, the legal and
policy ramifications are significant.4
Out of a myriad of concerns in this evolving arena 5-ranging
from criminal jurisdiction, to training, to labor and employment
law-this Article focuses on providing an overview of the "political
question" doctrine's development in recent case law associated with
civil complaints brought in American courts against contracting
companies operating in battlefield environments such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, a matter addressed by the author at the Review of
Litigation's Symposium-Terror on Trial: Civil Litigation in the
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an
unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or
another competent tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense.
Id.
3. According to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to United
States Central Command by ePluribus Media, as of January 1, 2008, there were
approximately 133,196 civilian contractors of various nationalities working under
U.S. contracts in Iraq. Susie Dow, Iraq Contractors: Raw Data from CENTCOM,
EPLURIBUS MEDIA, July 8, 2007, http://www.epluribusmedia.org/features/2007/
20070708_contracting-numbers.html; see also Christina M. Blyth, Minding the
Liability Gap: American Contractors, Iraq, and the Outsourcing of Impunity, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 651, 651 (2008) (estimating the number of civilian contractors to
be "somewhere over 100,000" in Iraq).
4. See Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues
Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233
(2000) (discussing the emerging legal and policy issues prior to the War on
Terror).
5. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, Contractors on the "Battlefield:"
Providing Adequate Protection, Anti-Terrorism Training, and Personnel Recovery
for Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Military in Combat and Contingency
Operations, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 323 (2006) (evaluating and discussing the
provision of adequate protection, anti-terrorism training, and personnel recovery
for civilian contractors deployed to support United States military operations).
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War on Terror. 6  The political question doctrine, which excludes
from judicial review all controversies involving policy choices and
other value determinations that the Constitution reserves to the
Congress and the Executive for resolution, represents a formidable
jurisdictional shield and will no doubt continue to be a source of
jurisprudence and debate in the future.
II. STATUS OF CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
"The terrible thing about war is that it usually kills the wrong
people. "-Anonymous.
7
According to a 2007 Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Report for Congress, the level of civilian contractor activities to
Department of Defense (DOD) missions-which encompass a wide
range of technical, logistical, maintenance, and security support
services-has caused a "substantial shift in the types of contracts for
troop support services." 8 To put it bluntly, without the extensive use
of civilian contractors in the War on Terror, the American military
could not conduct combat operations or contingency operations (also
called "military operations other than war" (MOOTW)). 9
6. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Professor, Saint Mary's Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks
at the Review of Litigation Symposium: Terror on Trial: Civil Litigation in the
War on Terror (Mar. 28, 2008).
7. E.C. MCKENZIE, 14,000 QUIPS & QUOTES FOR WRITING & SPEAKERS 541
(Wings Books 1980).
8. See VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, DEFENSE CONTRACTING IN IRAQ: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS ii (Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for
Congress No. RL33834, 2007), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/
commupload/PC704400/otherlinksfiles/CRSReport-on-DefenseContracting_
Iraqi 1 15-07.pdf (discussing the various types of Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP) contracts that have been awarded).
9. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2006), which states that:
The term "contingency operation" means a military operation that-
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or
against an opposing military force; or
(B) results in the call or order to, retention on, active duty of members of
the uniformed services .. . or any other provision of law during a war or
during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.
Symposium 2008]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
The reason for this phenomenon rests in several factors.
First, Congressional limits on the number of DOD personnel extend
both to the size of the armed forces in general and to the number of
uniformed personnel authorized in a particular operational mission or
area.10 Second, the ever-increasing sophistication and automation of
a wide variety of technologies used by the military requires a
workforce that often is not found in the uniformed services. Finally,
strategic and tactical needs mandate that the command authority
conserve DOD resources to address unanticipated exigencies.
Accordingly, tens of thousands of civilian engineers, technicians,
construction workers, food service providers, weapon specialists,
security guards, 1 and others work under government contracts with,
MOOTW operations include: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD
Support to Counterdrug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime
Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation
and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civilian Authorities,
Nation Assistance and/or Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombat Evacuation
Operations, Peace Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show
of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, and Support to Insurgency. J-7
OPERATIONAL PLANS & INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 17-27 (Joint Force Employ-
ment Briefing Modules, 1997), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm
mootw.pdf.
10. Force Caps set strict limits on the number and type of DOD personnel
that may be physically committed to a particular location, combat zone, or
mission. See also DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-100.21,
CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD § 1-1 (2003), http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/
files/fm3_100x21.pdf ("When military force caps are imposed on an operation,
contractor support can give the commander the flexibility of increasing his combat
power by substituting combat units for military support units.").
11. Americans serving as part of an armed security force under government
contract overseas are sometimes derogatorily referred to as mercenaries. This
categorization is false as civilian contractors employed as armed security forces do
not fit the accepted definition of a mercenary as set out in Article 47 of Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts art. 47, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
To be considered a mercenary an individual must meet all of the elements set out
at Article 47:
A mercenary is a person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad
in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in
hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party
[Vol. 28:2
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for example, the DOD and Department of State (DOS) to provide not
only "bullets and beans" to the military but also significant amounts
of the "muscle and brains." In addition, because civilian employees
of contractor companies work shoulder to shoulder with their mili-
tary counterparts in areas of present and imminent danger, over a
thousand of them have been killed and wounded. 12
Civilian contractors function under individualized contracts
either directly with the DOD or with other federal agencies such as
DOS. 13 Defense contracting can be divided into three general cate-
gories: theater support contracts, external support contracts, and
systems contracts.
One of the significant issues associated with the increased
use of civilian contractors in the War on Terror concerns the matter
of status. Under the law of war,15 which consists of customary
principles16 and international treaties-primarily the 1949 Geneva
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the
conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict (e)
is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has
not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official
duty as a member of its armed forces.
12. See David Ivanovich, Contractor Deaths up 17 Percent Across Iraq in
2007: As 'Surge' Took Effect, Spike in Killings Subsided, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 10,
2008, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/
5528613.html ("From the start of the war in March 2003 through Dec. 31 2007-
the latest figures available-1,123 civilian contractors are known to have died in
Iraq, according to the U.S. Labor Department.").
13. See GRASSO, supra note 8 (reviewing logistical support or "service
contracts").
14. See Addicott, supra note 5, at 335-36 (discussing the three main types of
defense contracts).
15. The basic goal of the law of war is to mitigate its inevitable evils by: "a.
[p]rotecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; b.
[s]afeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of
the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and c.
[f]acilitating the restoration of peace." DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No.
27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 2, at 3 (1956), available at http://
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/law-warfare- 1 956.pdf.
16. Customary international law consists of all those binding norms practiced
by nations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) ("Customary international law results from a general
Symposium 2008] 347
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Conventions' 7-all militaries must distinguish between combatants
(armed forces) and non-combatants (civilians) during international
armed conflicts. 18 Although allowed to accompany the military on
all categories of military operations, private civilian contractors are
neither combatants nor non-combatants. As recognized by the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
non-combatants have a special status that mandates they be treated as
prisoners of war (POWs), even though they are not military person-
nel: "persons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such as civilian members of aircraft crews,
war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or
of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces" are
treated as POWs when captured. 19
While the vast majority of the activities conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan relate to military operations conducted outside the scope
of a state of international armed conflict, 20 United States policy
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obliga-
tion.").
17. The primary international treaties dealing with the law of war are the
1949 Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
18. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 10, §§ 4-49 to 4-53 (describing the
status of contractors under the regulations set out in the Geneva convention). The
term "combatant" and "non-combatant" have extremely important implications in
the context of combat operations, especially with regard to prisoner of war (POW)
status. A civilian contractor who engages in combat operations may lose POW
status and even be categorized as an illegal combatant.
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 17, art. 4A(4).
20. The actual period of a state of international armed conflict in both
military engagements was measured in months. The military campaign against the
Taliban regime took approximately three months, from October 7, 2001, until
December 23, 2001. The military campaign against Saddam Hussein's Iraq took
less than two months, from March 20, 2003, to May 1, 2003, when President Bush
declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq.
[Vol. 28:2
CONTRA CTORS ON BATTLEFIELD
requires its armed forces to abide by the law of war on all
operations. 21 There are no exceptions.
III. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AS A SHIELD TO
LIABILITY FOR THE PARENT CONTRACTING COMPANY
"Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitu-
tion and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court. ,,22
Because military operations give rise to their fair share of
untoward activities caused by negligent or intentional acts, including
wrongful deaths and accidents, it is not surprising that during the
War on Terror parent contracting companies have faced a number of
civil law suits emanating from their civilian employees, other
contractors, military personnel, and host nation foreigners.23 In
tandem with the issue of criminal responsibility, which was ad-
21. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM 2 (2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
231 llp.pdf.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
23. But see Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 § 2 (June 17, 2004),
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status-of Coalition
_RevwithAnnexA.pdf, which provides immunity from all Iraqi civil and
criminal law for actions by coalition military forces as well as diplomats, contrac-
tors, and consultants. The order, signed by Paul Bremer just prior to leaving
office, provides that:
Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters
relating to the terms and conditions of their Contracts, including licensing
and registering employees, businesses and corporations; provided,
however, that Contractors shall comply with such applicable licensing
and registration laws and regulations if engaging in business or trans-
actions in Iraq other than Contracts. Notwithstanding any provisions in
this Order, Private Security Companies and their employees operating in
Iraq must comply with all CPA Orders, Regulations, Memoranda, and
any implementing instructions or regulations governing the existence and
activities of Private Security Companies in Iraq, including registration
and licensing of weapons and firearms.
Id. § 4.
Symposium 2008] 349
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dressed by Congress in the 2007 Defense Authorization Act,24 the
matter of civil liability for contracting companies has become an
important concern.
An often raised "defense"25 employed by the contracting
companies early on in the litigation process was the political
question doctrine, which, if adopted by the court, would serve as a
complete jurisdictional bar to the suit. As set out in the Supreme
Court case of Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,
"the political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those
controversies which revolve around policy choices and value
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution in the halls
of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch., 26 In other
words, even if the plaintiffs lawsuit is appropriate and meritorious
as to every other procedural and substantive matter, the political
question doctrine renders the case non-justiciable.27 Although the
court may have subject matter jurisdiction, the issues at hand are
deemed inappropriate for judicial resolution and left to the other two
branches of the federal government for resolution. 28 Accordingly,
24. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (authorizing trial
by military courts-martial for crimes committed by civilian contractors who
accompany military forces in both declared wars by Congress and on contingency
operations).
25. Other defenses on the merits revolve around the contract itself, which
commonly includes a variety of clauses that serve to indemnify the parent contract-
ing company from all liability. See Addicott, supra note 5, at 364-77.
26. 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
27. The "Government Contract Defense" is another defense that shields
contracting companies from judicial review for civil actions. The defense is
spelled out in the 1988 Supreme Court case Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
487 U.S. 500 (1988). In Boyle, a civil action was brought against a defense
contractor for negligently designing a helicopter escape hatch, resulting in the
death of the pilot when the helicopter crashed. The Supreme Court applied a
three-prong test to determine whether the contractor was immune from suit and
found that: (1) the contractor had taken actions at the direction of agency officials
exercising their discretionary authority; (2) the directions involved reasonably
precise specifications created by the government with which the contractor
complied; and (3) the contractor did not fail to warn the government of known
dangers associated with the government's design. Id. at 509. Therefore, the court
held that the contractor was immunized from tort liability for damages arising from
the alleged helicopter design defects. Id. at 512.
28. But cf ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6.1 (4th ed.,
Aspen Publishers 2003) (arguing that a court cannot apply the Baker test, which is
350 [Vol. 28:2
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since the case can be disposed of as non-justiciable, defense counsel
representing a subject contracting company invariably include the
political question doctrine either as a pre-answer motion or as an
integral part of the responsive pleading.
29
The political question doctrine is firmly set in separation of
powers concerns and originates under the case and controversy
requirement of Article III of the Constitution.30 In essence, courts
should refuse to intrude on those matters that are properly the
dominion of the more accountable branches of the federal govern-
ment. The question of how to identify a non-justiciable political
question was explored by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.3 The
so-called Baker inquiry lists six separate factors, any one of which
renders the case non-justiciable.32 The six Baker factors are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.33
While the test in Baker is broadly defined and apparently
listed in descending order of importance, with the first and second
used to identify a non-justicible political question, in a principled way to identify
cases that raise non-justiciable "political questions").
29. See Ian Kierpaul, The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, and Law
Students after Abu Ghraib: The Rush to Bring Private Military Contractors to
Justice, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 407 (2008) (discussing the political question doctrine
as it applies to lawsuits against parent contracting companies).
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
32. Id. at 217.
33. Id.
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factors providing the most weight, 34 it is well established that not all
matters regarding foreign policy would automatically trigger
exclusion from judicial review. 35 Each case mandates "a discrimi-
nating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the
history of its management by the political branches, of its suscep-
tibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the
specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action."
36
Because each case must be evaluated in light of the factors in Baker,
it is not surprising that lower courts will place great emphasis on
previous judicial rulings dealing with whether the actions of a
particular contracting company involved issues barred from review
under the political question doctrine. The problem, of course, is that
the various contingency operations associated with the War on
Terror have so far only provided a handful of cases against contract-
ing companies where federal courts have been able to make
comparisons and extrapolate common areas of agreement.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN
LAWSUITS AGAINST THE CONTRACTING COMPANY
"We readily acknowledge that flying over Afghanistan during war-
time is different from flying over Kansas on a sunny day. But this
does not render the suit inherently non-justiciable.
The civil lawsuit against a contracting company operating in
Iraq that has drawn the most national attention is a 2004 action filed
in the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina, against the
contracting company Blackwater Security Consulting and other
named defendants.38 Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting was
filed by the survivors of four deceased independent contractors who
34. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004).
35. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 ("[I]t is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.").
36. Id. at 211-12.
37. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364 (1Ith Cir.
2007).
38. For a good introduction to the issues at the initial filing of the case, see
Joseph Neff & Jay Price, Courts to Resolve Contractors' Deaths, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) Jan. 9, 2005, at Al, available at http://www
.newsobserver.com/front/story/283686.html.
352 [Vol. 28:2
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were murdered by terrorists on March 31, 2004, while escorting a
civilian convoy through Fallujah, Iraq.39 Among other allegations of
wrongdoing, the families asserted that Blackwater deliberately sent
the contractors into a hostile environment without proper equipment
and two armed team members, as promised in the contract. After a
long series of pleadings and various motions (including two attempts
by Blackwater to remove to federal court), North Carolina Eastern
District Court Judge James Fox sent the case into secret arbitration
based on an independent service agreement.4 1 Blackwater's attor-
neys argued the political question doctrine during the legal process
prior to arbitration, but no solid resolution of the issue was ever
provided by the court.42
While no contracting company has yet been held liable for
torts committed in the War on Terror, a handful of civil actions are
meandering through the judicial system and provide a sense of how
the political question doctrine is being developed.43 These decisions,
outlined in this section, will certainly assist in developing a working
legal framework.
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., decided in 2005, provided one of the
early attempts to address the political question doctrine. 44  In
Ibrahim, seven Iraqi nationals brought suit in federal court seeking
compensation against two private contracting companies, Titan and
CACI, operating under government contract in Iraq to provide
interpreters and interrogators for the U.S. military at the infamous
Abu Ghraib prison.45 The plaintiffs alleged various acts of assault
39. 382 F. Supp. 2d 801 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
40. Id. at 804-05.
41. Democracy Now! (Television broadcast May 23, 2007), available at
http://play.rbn.com/?url=demnow/demnow/demand/2007/may/video
/dnB20070523a.rm&proto=rtsp. A transcript of the relevant interview is available
online. Democracy Now!, Pivotal Family Lawsuit Against Blackwater USA
Blocked from Court -- and Moved to Panel with Company Ties (May 23, 2007),
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/5/23/pivotal-familylawsuitagainst
_blackwaterusa.
42. See SCAHILL, supra note 1, at 301-03 (discussing Blackwater's appellate
brief, filed October 31, 2005).
43. See, e.g., Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability
Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 259 (2008)
(commenting that as of 2007 no civilian contractor has been held liable for alleged
torts).
44. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
45. Id. at 12.
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and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful death, and torture at the hands of the contractors
and also sought recovery under the Alien Tort Statute46 and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).47
Although the defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit as non-
justiciable because it implicated political questions, the court flatly
ruled that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred by the political
question doctrine.48
While the ruling was clear, the accompanying legal analysis
for the decision was extremely weak. With only a passing acknowl-
edgment of the six-part Baker criteria, the court held that the
"political question doctrine may lack clarity ... but it is not without
standards. 49 Instead of fleshing out the specifics of the Baker fac-
tors, the court simply paraphrased the plurality's implicit conclusion
in the 2004 Supreme Court case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld5° and declared
that not every dispute that "can arguably be connected to 'combat"'
is excluded from judicial review by a separation of powers
argument.5
The Ibrahim court wrote that "[a]n action for damages arising
from the acts of private contractors and not seeking injunctive relief
does not involve the courts in" overseeing foreign policy or the use
of military force. 52  Indeed, the court's shallow justification for
rejecting the political question doctrine seems to have relied on the
fact that the suit was against a private contracting company, not the
United States government, for "actions of a type that both violate
clear Untied States policy ... and have led to recent high profile
court martial proceedings against United States soldiers."
53
The 2006 case of Smith v. Halliburton Co. involved a suit
against a civilian contractor who operated a dining facility on
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez in Mosul, Iraq. 54 In Decem-
ber 2004, a suicide bomber entered the dining facility, detonated
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006); Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
48. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
49. Id.
50. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
51. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
52. Id. at 16 (citing Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir.
1967)).
53. Id.
54. No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006).
354 [Vol. 28:2
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explosives packed with shrapnel, and murdered twenty-two people. 55
In contrast to Ibrahim, the Smith court applied the Baker factors and
determined that the contractor was operating pursuant to the
military's orders, instructions, regulations, and protection, and
therefore the contractor was under military control.56  Since the
control and access of military bases is clearly within the constitu-
tional powers reserved by both the President and Congress, the court
held that it would be overstepping its authority by ruling on such
decisions and intruding on constitutional powers granted to the
legislative and executive branches.57 The court concluded that the
political question doctrine would bar the contractor's claim, and thus
held that the case was non-justiciable.58 Indeed, at the heart of the
Baker analysis is the concern that the court may substitute its own
judgment for that of the military, which the court would surely have
to do in the context of FOB security measures.
In Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, the defendant moved for
dismissal, citing the political question doctrine. 59 The facts of the
case revealed that plaintiff Lessin, a U.S. Army active duty military
police (MP) soldier, suffered traumatic brain injury in Iraq while
providing a military escort for a truck convoy owned and operated
by private contracting company Kellogg Brown & Root. While
assisting the civilian driver of a Kellogg Brown & Root truck that
had stopped on the side of the road, Lessin was struck in the head by
the truck's ramp. The 2006 lawsuit, filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleged that the
parent contracting company was negligent in "inspecting, maintain-
ing, and repairing the truck that injured Lessin, and in supervising
the driver who was operating the truck.",
60
The defendant asserted that the case should be dismissed
based on one or more of the first four factors of the Baker test.
61
Respectively, the defendant argued that: (Baker factor one) adjudi-
cating the plaintiffs claims would require a detailed inquiry by the
court into military regulations and orders associated with military
escort procedures for civilian convoys; (Baker factor two) there are
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id. at *6.
58. Id. at *6-7.
59. No. 05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006).
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id. at *2.
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no judicially discoverable standards to determine whether or not the
military exercised reasonable judgment in regard to allowing the
subject truck to be a part of the convoy, halting and assisting the
subject truck in a combat zone, and overseeing proper maintenance
standards for the convoy truck; and (Baker factors three and four) the
court would be required to undertake a policy decision vis-A-vis the
military and civilian contractors in a combat zone which would
"express a lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government
that oversee such war efforts."
62
The Lessin court disagreed, noting that the case at hand was a
mere traffic accident that raised standard tort issues related to negli-
gence by the civilian driver coupled with allegations that the
company failed to properly train and supervise the employee.63 The
court wrote that the incident "was, essentially, a traffic accident,
involving a commercial truck alleged to have been negligently main-
tained, as well as a civilian truck driver who was allegedly negligent
in operating the truck and insufficiently trained. Claims of negli-
gence arising from this type of incident are commonly adjudicated
by courts, using well-developed judicial standards." 64 Still, the court
did agree that discovery might reveal additional facts to support
dismissal based on the political question doctrine. 65 The court ruled
that, at this stage of the lawsuit, "it is by no means clear that the
policies or decisions of the military or of the executive branch itself
will be implicated in this case."66
A month after the 2006 ruling in Lessin, a similar set of facts
was presented to a federal district court in Georgia. 67 In Whitaker v.
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., however, the court found that a U.S.
Army soldier killed in a vehicle accident while escorting a truck
supply convoy operated by Kellogg Brown & Root posed a non-
justiciable political question. 68 The soldier, Whitaker, was serving
duty as part of a military escort for a civilian convoy delivering
supplies under a government contract in Iraq. During the convoy,
Whitaker was struck by a civilian contractor driving a civilian truck
62. Id.




67. Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D.
Ga. 2006).
68. Id. at 1282.
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over the Tigris River in Iraq, fell into the Tigris River, and drowned.
Whitaker's parents, as plaintiffs, alleged negligence against the
contracting company Kellogg Brown & Root under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the negligence of its drivers.
69
Using the Baker factors as its guide, the court refused to
characterize the incident as a traffic accident involving standard
negligence claims, but instead viewed the matter as a wreck that
occurred in a combat zone during wartime involvino "strategic and
tactical military decisions made in a combat zone." Paying great
attention to a variety of U.S. Army regulations, which authorize the
use of civilian contractors "to perform selected services in wartime
to augment Army forces," the court went into great detail about how
these orders and regulations impacted across the full range of the
Baker factors. 71 Further, the court ruled that there were no judicially
discoverable and manageable standards to apply to the incident
because the standard for review is not what a reasonable driver
would have done, but what a reasonable driver in a combat zone
subject to military regulations and orders would have done.72
Finally, the court specifically recognized that because the military
was accomplishing "its mission by partnering with government
contractors who are subject to the military's orders, regulations, and
convoy plan," due deference had to be given to the political branches
of Congress and the Executive.73 "The Army will fight as a total
force-active and reserve components and civilians."
74
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1278.
71. Id. at 1279 (quoting DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION No. 700-
137, LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (LOGCAP) 1-1 (1985)). The
court placed great emphasis on Aktepe v. United States. 105 F.3d 1400 (1 1th Cir.
1997). The court in Aktepe found that the lawsuit for negligence brought by
Turkish nationals for injury suffered when two live missiles from a U.S. ship
accidentally stuck a Turkish vessel was barred by the political question doctrine.
Id. at 1403-04.
72. Whitaker, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
73. Id. at 1281 ("The Court finds that a soldier injured at the hands of a
contractor which is performing military functions subject to the military's orders
and regulations also raises the same political questions [as a soldier injured at the
hands of the military].").
74. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added); see also id. ("The Army will fight as part of
a joint team. Motor transport units must be prepared to support the inland surface
movement requirements of other services or nations and to integrate HN [Host
Nation], LOGCAP, or other contract support.").
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In Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., another 2006 decision, which
was subsequently overruled by the Fifth Circuit, employees of a
civilian contractor in Iraq filed suit alleging that the parent contract-
ing company had committed a wide variety of actionable wrongs,
including wrongful death, intentional infliction of physical and
emotional distress, and fraud. The case arose from an attack on a
convoy by anti-American forces in Iraq on the morning of April 9,
2004, resulting in the deaths and injury of several civilian contrac-
tors. Defendant's motion for dismissal based on the political ques-
tion doctrine was granted. 6 In short, the court determined that
decisions regarding when and where the convoy would be sent that
day were "so interwoven with Army decisions" that they touched at
least three of the Baker factors.77
The court held that "[t]he case at bar meets not one, but three
of the formulations described in Baker v. Carr."78 In fact, it actually
listed four of the Baker factors.79 The Fisher court reasoned that it
could not "try a case set on a battlefield during wartime without an
impermissible intrusion into powers expressly granted to the Execu-
tive by the Constitution. Baker factor one applied even if the
Army had no direct control over the civilian members of the
convoy-"Even assuming the court found this statement to be true
[that the civilian contractor company deployed, directed, and
controlled the convoy's civilian members], the private character of
the actions do not preclude the application of the political question
doctrine." 8' In addition, the court found that the second Baker factor
applied since a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards existed by which it could measure the responsibility of the
military in the context of the attack.82 Finding that the Army played
an integral part in the decision to deploy and protect the convoy, the
court noted that it would have to "substitute its judgment for that of
75. 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Lane v.
Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 644.
79. Id. (adding Baker factor four-a lack of respect due coordinate branches
of government).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 641.
82. Id. at 641-42.
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the Army," a determination prohibited by Baker.83 Finally, the court
listed the third and fourth Baker factors together-"nonjudicial
policy determination and lack of respect [due to coordinate branches
of government]"-as the final reasons for granting dismissal of the
civil action.84 The court recognized that it was not equipped to for-
mulate an examination of the many questions associated with the
incident-ranging from the wisdom of sending the convoy on a
particular route to the use of civilian contractors to drive the trucks.
85
When the case was appealed, the Fifth Circuit held that there was not
yet sufficient evidence to dismiss under the political question
doctrine, and the case was remanded for further factual hearings.
86
In McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the political question doctrine.87 The
facts of the case show that civilian contractor company Presidential
Airways (Presidential) was under military contract to provide
transportation and operational support to the DOD in Afghanistan.
On one such flight in Afghanistan, the plane crashed, killing all
aboard. 88
Survivors of United States soldiers brought suit against
Presidential in a Florida federal district court claiming negligence
regarding the staffing, equipping, and operation of the subject
flight.89 In the Eleventh Circuit opinion, the court dismissed the first
Baker factor, finding that while the military was involved in choos-
ing the starting and ending points of various Presidential flights, the
military's role in directing the activities was "relatively discrete.'
90
The court reasoned that because the contract provided that Presiden-
tial was responsible for supervision, management, and administration
of its operations, the trial court would not be challenging the duties
assigned by the military, but the duties performed by Presidential. 91
83. Id. at 643.
84. Id. at 644.
85. Id.
86. Lane v. Halliburton, Inc., 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008).
87. 502 F.3d 1331 (1lth Cir. 2007), aff'g 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla.
2006).
88. McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
89. Id. at 1315.
90. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1361.
91. Id. at 1362 ("While Presidential had these general supervisory responsi-
bilities according to the SOW [Statement of Work], the military's duties
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The court found that the second Baker factor did not present matters
that were inherently unmanageable since the standards to assess the
issue were the same "as in any tort suit involving a plane crash. 92
Because the court felt the facts demonstrated minimal military
involvement and the type of claim was squarely in the realm of a
negligence claim, the remaining Baker factors were disposed of in
quick step.
93
An Alabama federal district court also addressed the issue of
the political question doctrine in the 2006 case of Potts v. Dyncorp
International, LLC.94  Potts, a civilian contractor in Iraq, sued
another contractor company over personal injuries he suffered as a
result of a car accident in Iraq. Potts was a passenger in a convoy
traveling on the main supply route from Trebil, Jordan, to Baghdad,
Iraq. The driver of the vehicle was a Dyncorp employee who
crashed the vehicle at a high rate of speed while trying to avoid a
"black object in the road."95
Analogizing to Lessin, the Potts court found that the case did
not satisfy any of the Baker factors. 96 The court held that the first
and third Baker factors were not satisfied because the incident at
hand related to assessing Dyncorp's internal policies concerning its
contract with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which did
not involve "decisions regarding foreign policy at such a level where
judicial review would encroach upon the constitutional authority of
one or both of the politically accountable branches." 97 In contrast to
the Whitaker approach, which focused heavily on a variety of mili-
tary directives and orders associated with civilian contractors and the
fact that convoy operations were controlled by the military,98 the
court in Potts focused on the terms of the specific contract between
Dyncorp and the CPA and ignored any connection with the military
(according to the SOW) were relatively discrete. The military chose the start and
end points of the flights, and chose when the flights would be flown (qualified by
Presidential's power to decline a mission for safety reasons.)").
92. Id. at 1364.
93. Id. at 1364-65.
94. 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
95. Id. at 1248. The case indicates that the object was actually a black dog
and not a roadside bomb. Id.
96. Id. at 1253-54 (citing Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. 05-01853,
2006 WL 3940556, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006)).
97. Id. at 1249, 1252-54.
98. Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281-82
(M.D. Ga. 2006).
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that would activate the first Baker factor.99  In discounting the
second Baker factor, the court ruled that because the vehicle accident
was a claim of negligence commonly adjudicated under well-
established legal parameters, it was able to "assess whether the
private contractor was negligent or wanton, even when performing
services in a war zone."
100
In 2008, a federal district court in Georgia held that a civil
action brought against Kellogg Brown & Root was non-justiciable
under the political question doctrine.10' After first denying a motion
to dismiss based on the political question doctrine, 10 2 the court
allowed Kellogg Brown & Root to renew the motion at the close of
discovery. 10 3 Taking cognizance of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in
McMahon, which spoke favorably about the Whitaker finding of a
non-justiciable political question,10 4 the court in Carmichael ruled in
favor of the motion to dismiss. 
105
Clearly, the facts in Carmichael were very similar to the facts
of Whitaker. In Carmichael, a United States Army soldier was in-
jured in a convoy accident. 10 6 The soldier was an armed escort
passenger in a tractor-trailer driven by a civilian contractor in a
convoy in Iraq when the vehicle's driver lost control and drove off
the road, causing the vehicle to overturn. In finding that the first
Baker factor applied, the court concluded "the army did in fact
control every aspect of the organization, planning and execution of
the convoy in question.1 0 7 Accordingly, the court determined that it
would have to pass judgment on military decisions "of the type
typically insulated from judicial review."
10 8
99. Potts, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53.
100. Id. at 1253.
101. Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1363
(N.D. Ga. 2008).
102. Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373,
1375 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
103. Carmichael, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
104. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364 n.32
(11 th Cir. 2007) (citing Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc, 444 F. Supp. 2d
1277, 1281-82 (M.D. Ga. 2006)).
105. Carmichael, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (citing McMahon, 502 F.3d at
1364).
106. Id. at 1363.
107. Id. at 1368.
108. Id. at 1371.
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This same analysis flowed into the second Baker factor. In
finding that the second Baker factor was applicable, the court placed
great emphasis on the fact that it would have to question the
military's decisions regarding "the planning and conduct of the
convoy," a judicially unmanageable issue. 10 9 The court refused to
consider the remaining Baker factors because finding only one factor
suffices to bar the case under the political question doctrine." 1
0
The final case to date is the 2008 Fifth Circuit ruling in Lane
v. Halliburton.111 The case involved a civil action by a group of
Halliburton civilian employees against Halliburton for injuries
sustained while working in Iraq as truck drivers." 12 The district court
had dismissed the case as non-justiciable under the political question
doctrine," 3 but the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that
the case needed "further factual development before it can be known
whether that doctrine is actually an impediment [to jurisdiction].""
' 14
The Fifth Circuit examined all of the Baker factors and set out all of
the arguments-pro and con-regarding the political question
doctrine.1 15 It warned that the matter would certainly require addi-
tional analysis at the district court level, but that it "may be possible
to resolve the claims without needing to make a constitutionally
impermissible review of wartime decision-making.""11 6 It remains to
be seen what the focused legal framework outlined by the Fifth
Circuit will produce as the case is reconsidered at the district level.
V. CONCLUSION
"The litigation [regarding the complexities associated with applying
the Baker factors] is not yet there, if it ever will be."
117
109. Id. at 1372.
110. Id.
111. 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008).
112. Id. at 554.
113. Lane v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd
sub nom. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008).
114. Lane, 529 F.3d at 554.
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Political questions are deemed non-justiciable, but the
determination can only be made after a "discriminating inquiry into
the precise facts and posture of the particular case. ' ' 11  While it is
undeniable that civilian contractors provide essential combat-related
services on the battlefield-as evidenced in reality and in a variety of
official military instructions and regulations deeming them part of
the military "total force"' 9-this does not mean that civilian
contractors will be provided the same protections accorded to the
military under the political question doctrine. A review of the case
law suggests that a central distinction between the conflicting
opinions emanating from recent cases applying the political question
doctrine to civilian contractors on the battlefield is the particular
contractor's relationship to the military and the actual military opera-
tion in question.
It is clear that the political question doctrine will not preclude
judicial review simply because there exists some nexus between the
contractor and the military. 120 In the words of the Eleventh Circuit
ruling in McMahon, for the political question doctrine to serve as a
jurisdictional bar, the nexus between the contractor and the military
must strike at "core military decisions, including [military] commu-
nication, training, and drill procedures."'' 21 Closely associated with
the nature and integration of the military/contractor relationship is
the question of whether a particular court will have to second-guess
the particulars of a military operation, or whether the court can
determine that it need only evaluate the civilian contractor's perfor-
mance under the contract.
Finally, it is not surprising that the developing trend for
dealing with motions to dismiss based on the political question
doctrine is for the subject court to delay the determination until the
close of discovery, when the fullest amount of information is availa-
ble to measure against the Baker factors. Given the consequences of
118. Baker v. Carr, 369U.S. 186, 216 (1962).
119. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 10, §§ 6-4 to 6-6 (assigning
the responsibility for contractors to the commander); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY
REG. No. 715-9, CONTRACTORS ACCOMPANYING THE FORCE § 1-5(k)(2), (3)
(1999) (discussing military responsibility for providing adequate force protection
for civilian contractors working for the military overseas).
120. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. All contractors may lay
claim to this nexus-they are, by definition, under contract with the government.
121. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359 (1 1th Cir.
2007).
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a non-justiciability finding, each side deserves the fullest opportunity
to present all the facts at hand.
